Since 1999, ICSID tribunals have almost systematically held that they have the power not only to recommend but also to order provisional measures under Article 47 of the ICSID Convention and Rule 39 of the Arbitration Rules. This article argues that the legal arguments offered by these tribunals are often not fully elaborated and in any case not entirely convincing. It then provides an alternative reading of the decisions relating to the mandatory character of provisional measures, in the sense that they imply a signifi-cant departure from the meaning the contracting parties recorded in the treaty. Yet, as the majority of ICSID members have endorsed, accepted or at least acquiesced in such departure, it appears that Article 47 of the ICSID Convention has been informally modi-fied through subsequent practice.
I

Introduction
In a long stream of substantially identical decisions starting with Maffezini v. Spain,1 ICSID tribunals have upheld their power to order provisional measures under Article 47 of the ICSID Convention. Since Article 47 of the ICSID Convention expressly authorizes ICSID tribunals only to recommend such measures, it is worth examining the significance and implications of these decisions from the standpoint of the law of treaties.
The article first offers a concise discussion of the nature and role of provi-sional measures in the settlement of international disputes, before reviewing the leading cases of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other inter-national tribunals (sections II to IV). It then briefly describes the emergence of what appears to be a jurisprudence constante in ICSID investment arbitra-tion (section V) and examines the persuasiveness of the underlying legal rea-soning (section VI). Section VII is dedicated to the attitudes of ICSID members with regard to these decisions. The final objective of the article is to appraise the impact of the concordant body of decisions in combination with the (lack of) reaction of Member States to the ICSID Convention from the standpoint of the interpretation and possibly the informal modification of Article 47.
The discussion is limited to the alleged competence of ICSID tribunals to order provisional measures. It does not deal with the relationship between provisional measures and jurisdiction nor the conditions under which provi-sional measures can be granted.
II
Provisional Measures in the Settlement of International Disputes
When a case is filed before an international tribunal, the object of the whole procedure is to settle the dispute and to grant effective remedies to the parties to the extent the claims, and possibly the counterclaims, brought forward are considered to have merit. The dispute concerns a network of material or im-material goods as well as subjective legal situations (rights and obligations). In the nature of things, the procedure takes some time and tribunals may grant interim protection or provisional measures, the purpose of which is "to pre-serve the respective rights of the Parties, pending a decision of the Court, and presupposes that irreparable prejudice shall not be caused to rights which are the subject of dispute in judicial proceedings".2 Provisional measures normally set up duties of abstention rather than call-ing upon the parties to perform possibly onerous actions. They are not made the object of a judgment. The latter is a jurisdictional act covered by the force of res judicata and flows from a contentious procedure during which the com-peting arguments of the parties are heard and the court decides on the claim. Provisional measures are rather pronounced through an order (ordonnance). This entails that in cases of urgency there is no need to go through the parties' arguments as ordinarily set out in written pleadings and presented at hearings. This course of procedure gives the matter the necessary flexibility: provisional measures can be altered during the proceedings and new ones can be granted. There is no res judicata attached to such measures,3 with the possible excep-tion that an arbitral tribunal would violate procedural public policy if it de-parted from opinions expressed in a preliminary award rendered in the same case.4 When the tribunal declines to exercise its jurisdiction or delivers the final judgment, the provisional measures automatically lose their function and expire. The "interim" protection thus gives way to the substantive "final" pro-tection of the rights and obligations at stake.
Although provisional measures are normally requested by the parties,5 the issue of interim protection may also be raised in the interest of the tribunal in the proper administration of justice and effectiveness of the proceedings of which it is seized. If the final judgment's impact can be impaired by actions of the parties while the dispute is pending, the prestige of the tribunal and the effectiveness of its adjudication process could be heavily jeopardized. That is the reason why provisional measures can also be taken by tribunals on their own authority (proprio motu). 6 With regard to the binding effect of provisional measures, there are two schools of thought.7 On one hand, it has been argued, with regard to the pro-visional measures indicated by the ICJ, that their binding character is func-tionally indispensable as otherwise the very object of the entire proceedings, namely the protection of the parties' rights, would be frustrated. The argument is further buttressed by the principle of good faith in the sense that, once the parties have accepted the tribunal's jurisdiction, they also assume certain accessory obligations which are necessary to enable the tribunal to fully dis-charge its mission.8 The binding nature of provisional measures has also been considered as inherent to the tribunal's function or dictated by logic.9
On the other hand, some authors have maintained that there is no neces-sary symmetry between the final judgment and provisional measures. Inspired by the principle that the sovereignty of States should not be limited without a clear legal entitlement to do so, and fearing that a bold course on provisional measures could discourage States to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ, they have argued that these measures ought to be considered non-binding unless The word "indicate" rather than "order" or "decide" may suggest non-mandatory measures; but, in reality, the word is compatible with either interpretation, since it is neutral. The words "ought to be taken" rather than "shall be taken" may also suggest some non-binding feature; but the corresponding French wording, predomi-nant in 1920, reads "doivent être prises", which conveys the idea of a binding character. The main point, according to the Court, is to preserve to the full extent its own ability to properly fulfil its judicial function. The finding was consistently reit-erated in subsequent decisions. In 2007, the ICJ further held that the finding in the LaGrand decision on the mandatory character of provisional measures merely clarified (rather than developed) the meaning that Article 41 of the Statute had always had, with the consequence that it was applicable to measures adopted before 2001. It observed that The Court modestly veiled this part of judicial creativity by hiding behind the classic positivistic canon whereby the decision taken flows from the applicable norm in its original complexion. Lex semper loquitur. This fic-tion has perhaps a certain importance in international law where sovereign States are particularly sensitive to inroads into their sovereignty. Its function is to reassure States about the "proper behaviour" of the ICJ, which purportedly does not seek to carve out from the Statute more powers than States (origi-nally) granted to it. But it stands to reason that institutional texts, as much as others, must not be interpreted only in the light of their historical sense. The interpreter can take into account later developments and engage in objective or dynamic interpretation of the meaning a provision should have today. This the Court did; and on that account it cannot be blamed.
Another aspect of the matter needs to be noted. Often, the analysis stops with the finding that provisional measures under Article 41 of the ICJ Statute have legally binding character. Apart from the fact that the ICJ could also issue non-binding measures if it found that through an appropriate course (who can do more can do less), little room is devoted to the exact consequences of that finding. It has been argued that the statement of the Court in LaGrand is disas-trous since it might affect the readiness of States to submit their disputes to the Court.17 This classic argument, used every time the Court has not deferred to the whims and wishes of a State, has no great weight: since 2001, there has been no significant change in the submission of cases to the Court.
But taking now a look from another perspective, the question remains as to what consequences the breach of the provisional injunction entails. As with any breach of international obligations, non-compliance with binding pro-visional measures engages international responsibility and triggers the duty to make reparation.18 With regard to the form of reparation, in particular, a perusal of the recent practice shows that the Court limits itself to granting satisfaction for the breach of such measures through a finding in its reasoning and one operative paragraph. In other words, the Court states in its judgment on the merits that the concerned State has breached the obligation to execute the provisional measures. The Court even refused to burden the wrongfully be-having State with procedural costs under Article 64 of the Statute, with regard to additional costs provoked by the breach of these measures (e.g. additional pleadings for other provisional measures).19 This is hardly an incentive to hon-our such measures.
The Court should endeavour to give more teeth to its binding measures under Article 41 of the Statute. One option would be to place procedural costs on the party at fault under a new interpretation of Article 64 of the Statute. Another option would be to impose specific duties of restitution or of compen-sation for all the proximate (as opposed to incidental or remote) consequences of the unlawful act. Still another option would be to elaborate a specific set of consequences for that type of unlawful act, e.g. certain procedural disadvan-tages for the State at fault, thus, that State would not receive certain benefits as long as it had not executed the measures. It also stands to reason that these approaches could be combined. For the time being, the Court seems to be re-maining extremely cautious in this regard. It seems to have been impressed about the leap it dared to take in 2001 and therefore desirous of waiting for some time to pass before carrying further ahead on this subject matter.
IV
Other International Tribunals
Although a review of the law and practice of international tribunals with re-gard to provisional measures is clearly beyond the scope of this article, it is worth briefly discussing the provisions contained in some international legal instruments related to the settlement of international disputes. In some of them, the binding nature of these measures is uncontroversial. This is the case, in particular, of Article 290 of the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982, which provides that "the court or tribunal may prescribe any provisional measures which it considers appropriate under the circumstances to preserve the re-spective rights of the parties to the dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine environment, pending the final decision".20
In (2) provides that "in cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons, the Court shall adopt such provisional measures as it deems pertinent in matters it has under consideration", whereas under Rule 25 the Court "may, at the request of a party or on its own motion, order such provisional measures as it deems pertinent". The Inter-American Court has consistently indicated that compliance with provisional measures is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of its decisions on the merits and has not hesitated to order the concerned State to adopt provisional measures.22
The binding nature of provisional measures under the European Convention on Human Rights, on the contrary, has been controversial for several years. and that any standing international jurisdiction should be presumed to have the power to issue binding provisional measures when they are entitled to "in-dicate", "order", "prescribe" or "adopt" such measures.30 It is against this back-ground that the ICSID jurisprudence has to be appreciated.
V
Decisions by ICSID Tribunals
The adoption of provisional measures by ICSID tribunals is governed by Article 47 of the ICSID Convention and further defined in Rule 39 of the Arbitration Rules.31
In accordance with Article 47 of the ICSID Convention, a tribunal "may, if it considers the circumstances so require, recommend any provisional measures which should be taken to preserve the respective interests of either party" (emphasis added).
In the other two authentic languages, namely French and Spanish, Article 47 reads respectively: "le Tribunal peut, s'il estime que les circonstances l'exigent, recommander toutes mesures conservatoires propres à sauvegarder les droits des parties" (emphasis added); and "el Tribunal, si con-sidera que las circunstancias así lo requieren, podrá recomendar la adopción de aquellas medidas provisionales que considere necesarias para salvaguardar los respectivos derechos de las partes". Under Rule 39 of the Arbitral Rules, in turn, a party may request that provisional measures for the preservation of its rights be recommended by the Tribunal. The request shall specify the rights to be preserved, the measures the recommendation of which is requested, and the circumstances that require such measures (emphasis added). and 'indicate' in the ICJ Statute are quite clear, suggesting that one cannot rightly assume that a 'request' is comparatively weaker than a 'recommenda-tion', or that neither is binding".37
The argument was fortified by a reference to the principle that the parties to a pending dispute should not take steps that might aggravate it or prejudice the execution of the award.38 In Perenco v. Ecuador, the tribunal held that [i] rrespective of the precise terminology used, the Tribunal's efforts to effectuate its mandate under a treaty by prevailing on the parties to maintain the status quo in the case before it are binding on the par-ties pursuant to their obligations under said treaty. […] . In becoming a Party to a treaty such as the ICSID Convention […], a State confers upon an arbitral tribunal jurisdiction over certain claims and assumes an obli-gation to take whatever steps might be necessary to comply with deci-sions rendered by the tribunal pursuant to the treaty. So long as and to the extent that the arbitration is in progress, both parties are under an international obligation to comply with whatever the tribunal issues as provisional measures for the purpose of protecting its jurisdiction and its ability, should it so decide, to grant the relief requested. State Parties to the ICSID Convention thus inherently are under an international obliga-tion to comply with provisional measures issued by an ICSID tribunal.39
A stream of decisions confirming the mandatory character of provisional mea-sures has followed this line of reasoning.40 Tribunals refrained from under- taking any detailed analysis of the relevant provisions and simply conformed themselves to what they considered as the consolidated jurisprudence on this point, normally accompanied with reference to a couple of prior decisions.
The following sequence of decisions clearly illustrates how tribunals have built up the jurisprudence on this point. In Tokios Tokelès v. Ukraine, the tribu-nal confined itself to point out that "according to a well-established principle laid down by the jurisprudence of the ICSID tribunals, provisional measures 'recommended' by an ICSID tribunal are legally compulsory; they are in effect 'ordered' by the tribunal, and the parties are under a legal obligation to comply with them".41
Four years later, another tribunal held that "although Article 47 of the ICSID Convention uses the word 'recommend', the Tribunal is, in fact, empowered to order provisional measures. This has been recognized by numerous interna-tional tribunals, among them the ICSID tribunal in the Tokios Tokelés case".42 Another eight years passed and in PNG v. Papua New Guinea the tribunal reiterated the power of ICSID tribunals to order -instead of recommend -provisional measures.43 It refrained from elaborating any legal argument to support this conclusion and laconically relied on a single decision, Occidental v. Ecuador, which in turn made a reference to "numerous international tribu-nals", but expressly indicates only the tribunal appointed in Tokios Tokelés v.
Ukraine.44
The view that ICSID tribunals may order provisional measures under Article 47 has found limited opposition. In Caratube v. Kazakhstan, the tribunal held, without any explanation, that "according to Rule 39, the Tribunal cannot order, but can only recommend provisional measures in ICSID proceedings".45 In a more recent case, a dissenting arbitrator argued that the text of Article 47 of the ICSID Convention and Rule 39 of the Arbitration Rules is unequivocal in providing that an ICSID tribunal may recommend -as opposed to orderprovisional measures. In his words, "no matter how many times it is repeated, an order is not a recommendation. Only in the jurisprudence of an imaginary Wonderland would this make sense".46 He further fortified the literal interpre-tation with a double acontrario argument. On the one hand, he argued that had the contracting parties to the ICSID Convention intended to confer on ICSID tribunals the power to order provisional measures they would have drafted Article 47 differently and articulated some standards or guidance for grant-ing these measures. On the other hand, he emphasised that, unlike Article 47 of the ICSID Convention, the corresponding article in the Additional Facility Rules -Article 46 -contains a reference to the provisional measures "ordered" by the tribunal.47 Additionally, the legally binding nature of provisional mea-sures has been occasionally challenged -without success -by States.48 Apart from this rather isolated criticism, ICSID tribunals' decisions on provisional measures resemble a litany combining, on the one hand, the admis-sion that the ordinary meaning, the context and the travaux préparatoires of Article 47 of the ICSID Convention militate against the power to order such measures, and, on the other hand, the decisive findings based on the Spanish text of Rule 39 of the Arbitration Rules as well as on the ICJ jurisprudence that provisional measures need to be mandatory in order to fulfil their function, namely to preserve effectively the rights of the parties. The award in Quiborax v. Bolivia, dealing, inter alia, with the order issued by the tribunal to the respondent to take as a matter of provisional measures all appropriate measures to suspend certain criminal proceedings directly related to the arbitration,49 conveniently states the point. In the tribunal's words,
[i]t is true that the ordinary meaning of this provision, especially the terms 'recommend' and 'should be taken' do not convey the notion of a binding order. The same can be said for the context; other provisions of the ICSID Convention use different language when referring to binding obligations. Similarly, the travaux préparatoires of the ICSID Convention, to the extent relevant as supplementary means of interpretation, show that an earlier draft using the word 'prescribe' was then changed to 'rec-ommend'. Despite this, ICSID tribunals have consistently found that they have the power to make binding orders for provisional measures. The rationale is that these decisions derive their mandatory force from the function of provisional remedies, which is to secure the applicant's rights while the proceedings are pending. To use the words of the ICJ in LaGrand, 'the power in question is based on the necessity, when the cir-cumstances call for it, to safeguard, and to avoid prejudice to, the rights of the parties as determined by the final judgment of the Court'. While the wording and the context of Article 41 of the ICJ Statute are not strictly identical to those of the ICSID Convention ('indicate' instead of 'recom-mend'), the function of the measures is the same.50
The tribunal also held that failure to adopt the provisional measures ordered under Article 47 amounts to a breach of such provision, but does not neces-sarily entail a violation of the duty to arbitrate in good faith.51 It did not attach any specific consequences to non-compliance with provisional measures. It is generally accepted that ICSID tribunals may take the attitude of the parties regarding provisional measures into account when dealing with the merits of the dispute.
VI
Analysis of Legal Argument in Favour of the Mandatory Character of Provisional Measures according to the Applicable Legal Provisions
It is submitted that the finding that ICSID tribunals have the power not only to recommend but also to impose provisional measures is not persuasive as a matter of treaty interpretation. In the first place, the focus and insistence 50 Quiborax v. Bolivia, supra note 33, Award, paras. 578-579. On preparatory work, see infra text note 57.
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The tribunal felt the need to clarify in footnote 743 that "provisional measures issued under Article 47 are binding per se, a failure to comply with them will automatically entail a breach of Article 47. This does not necessarily give rise to a breach of the underlying right that the measures seek to preserve; whether those rights are harmed will depend on the facts of the case". The tribunal eventually found no breaches of the duty of good faith regarding the procedural conduct in the arbitration, paras. 594-596.
on Rule 39 of the Arbitration Rules rather than on Article 47 of the ICSID Convention is unfortunate as the former are meant to implement the latter and be "subject to the Convention".52 As a result, the interpreter must consider first and foremost Article 47 of the ICSID Convention. The Arbitration Rules could be used, when appropriate, to confirm, clarify or determine the meaning attached to Article 47 of the ICSID Convention. It follows that tribunals are expected to concentrate on Article 47 of the ICSID Convention and to meticulously interpret it in accordance with Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), keeping in mind that "the text of the treaty is deemed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties; and its elucidation, rather than wide-ranging searches for the supposed intentions of the parties, is the proper object of interpretation."53
The ordinary meaning of Article 47 of the ICSID Convention is straightforward. All three of the authentic versions of the treaty refer to the power of ICSID tribunals to recommend provisional measures. The verb "to recom-mend" has an unambiguous meaning, which is definitely distinct from that of the verb "to order". In using it in Article 47, the contracting parties to a treaty made a deliberate choice for the purpose of defining the powers of the tribu-nals and the related obligations of the parties to the dispute.
That ICSID tribunals have received the power to recommend, but not to order, provisional measures is fully consistent with the object and purpose of both the treaty as a whole and Article 47 of the ICSID Convention. It cannot be postulated that these objects and purposes, namely ensuring a stable legal framework and an adequate protection of foreign investment, imperatively demand that ICSID tribunals have the competence to order the adoption of provisional measures.
Arbitration Rule From the standpoint of Article 33 of the VCLT, furthermore, it must be pointed out that the interpreter is not supposed to select one or several lan-guages, but rather to extract from the treaty "the best reconciliation of the differences".55 Elevating the term dictación used in just one version of Rule 39 to the crucial element for the interpretation of Rule 39 is questionable, espe-cially when considering the rest of the Spanish version as well as the English and French versions, which unmistakably reveal the recommendatory nature of provisional measures. This conclusion is further strengthened by the clear indication contained in the Spanish version of note B to Arbitration Rule 39, published by ICSID in 1968, that "a menos que las partes convengan lo con-trario, el Tribunal sólo tiene la facultad de 'hacer recomendaciones'". 56 Should any doubts remain, they should be dissipated by the travaux prépara-toires. The question of the nature of provisional measures was raised during the negotiations and the proposal to confer on tribunals to order their adop-tion was defeated. The verb "to prescribe" that appeared in a previous draft of what would become Article 47 of the ICSID Convention was eventually sup-planted by the verb "to recommend", thus demonstrating the reluctance of the contracting parties to confer on ICSID tribunals the power to order provisional measures.57
With regard to the LaGrand decision, there is no doubt that ICSID tribunals are allowed -and indeed must be encouraged58 -to look at the legal argu-ments developed by the ICJ as a source of inspiration to interpret investment-related treaties and to settle investment disputes. Yet, they must make sure that such arguments are susceptible to being extended to investment disputes, a question that largely depends on the text and content of the relevant legal in-struments, which in the case under discussion are Article 41 of the ICJ Statute, Article 47 of the ICSID Convention and Rule 39 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. In the decisions sketched out above, ICSID tribunals conceded the sig-nificant textual differences between Article 47 of the ICSID Convention and Article 41 of the ICJ Statute. They nonetheless largely overlooked them and did not see any obstacle to transposing in an almost mechanical fashion to the former the interpretation of the latter adopted by the ICJ. They passively borrowed the legal argument elaborated in LaGrand without inquiring as to the difference between Article 41 of the ICJ Statute and Article 47 of the ICSID Convention. The former consistently and in all authentic languages uses the verb "to recommend", whereas the latter employs, in the English, Spanish and French texts, the verb "to indicate". The importance of the difference must not be underestimated since the use of "to recommend" in Article 47 of the ICSID Convention results from a deliberate choice made by the contracting parties, which were well aware of the text of Article 41 of the ICJ Statute. Leaving aside its persuasiveness,59 the legal argument underpinning the LaGrand decision can find limited application in relation to Article 47 of the ICSID Convention. Two final related considerations -both having a distinct teleological flavour -deserve to be mentioned. The first concerns the well-established principle that the parties to a dispute must refrain from taking measures sus-ceptible to aggravate the dispute or hamper the execution of the award.60 The principle alone does not postulate the power of an arbitral tribunal to order mandatory provisional measures. Otherwise, the entire debate on the horta-tory or mandatory character of provisional measures that opposed leading scholars for decades would not have made any sense. The existence of such an obligation and the legal nature of a decision by a tribunal on provisional measures are two different questions. The parties to a dispute must comply with the obligations stemming from the principle independently from the powers conferred on the tribunal or their exercise. 61 The second consideration relates to the consequences of disregarding a tri-bunal's recommendation on provisional measures. During the negotiation of the ICSID Convention, a proposal that intended to introduce a sanction for non-compliance with these measures was rejected.62 Instead, it was agreed that ICSID tribunals would "take into account" such conduct.63 Some authors have associated the fact that tribunals could take into account the reluctance of any party to adopt the recommended measures with a "moral obligation" to do so. 64 Be that as it may, the very fact that no sanction was attached to non-compliance seems to confirm -or at least to be compatible with -the horta-tory nature of such provisional measures.
VII
Relevance of the Attitude of ICSID Members
If it is accepted that the interpretation upheld in the decisions sketched out above is not persuasive, it is appropriate to inquire with regard to what the consequences and implications may be.65 From this perspective, it must be kept in mind that the parties to a treaty remain "the transaction's exclusive and absolute domini"66 and that international rules -including those contained in international agreements -are created, modified and discarded through claims, counterclaims, actions and reactions by the subjects of international law.67 Given the significant number of coherent decisions upholding the manda-tory character of provisional measures, it is not surprising that ICSID tribu-nals have recently limited themselves to referring to these decisions and have been reluctant to engage in a full discussion on the matter. Such an attitude is likely to be consolidated in future decisions. True, each tribunal is not legally bound by previous decisions.68 But it is also expected to consider and follow established case law to the fullest possible extent, with a view to enhancing the coherence and predictability of the whole system.69 As pointed out by an ICSID tribunal, unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary, it ought to follow solutions established in a series of consistent cases, comparable to the case at hand, but subject of course to the specifics of a given treaty and of the circumstances of the actual case. By doing so, it will meet its duty to seek to contribute to the harmonious development of investment law and thereby to meet the legitimate expectations of the community of States and investors towards certainty of the rule of law.70
Yet, the crux of the matter remains the subsequent practice of the parties to the ICSID Convention with a view to establishing the possible informal modifica-tion of Article 47 in the sense of allowing ICSID tribunals to order provisional measures. Article 31 (3) (b) of the VCLT clearly directs the interpreter to take into account any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty estab-lishing the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.71 From this perspective, the WTO Appellate Body has lucidly pointed out that this requires "a 'concordant, common and consistent' sequence of acts or pronouncements which is sufficient to establish a discernible pattern implying the agreement of the parties [to a treaty] regarding its interpretation". 72 It therefore becomes crucial to assess the reaction or lack of reaction of the parties to the ICSID Convention. In this regard, it must first be emphasized that arbitral decisions cannot be treated as State practice.73 They remain the pronouncements of arbitral tribunals that have been mandated by the parties to settle a specific dispute between them. Strictly speaking, the effects of their decisions are confined to the parties to the dispute. They may, nonetheless, in-fluence State practice and trigger States' reactions either in support or against the interpretation taken by the tribunal. The lack of reaction to or the acqui-escence in a consistent and significant body of decisions may amount to State practice and demonstrate the general acceptance by the parties to the treaty of the interpretation emerging from the arbitral decisionseven to the point of informally modifying the treaty through subsequent practice. 74 Acceptance by the disputing investor, on the contrary, is immaterial for the purpose of State practice, as only the States parties are the masters of the treaty. What is decisive is to establish whether State practice -rather than arbitral decisions -is sufficiently concordant, common and consistent. 75 With regard to the mandatory character of provisional measures, it is consequently the general acceptance of or acquiescence in arbitral tribunals' de-cisions by the parties to the ICSID Convention that may lead -or may have
